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Constitutional Civil Rights
by Hon. C. Ashley Royal*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment presents some of the most nettlesome, yet
interesting, issues for attorneys and federal judges. Once again this
term, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dealt with some
complex issues in cases involving nude dancing, freedom of the press,
religious symbols, commerce, and the Confederate battle flag. The court
even stirred nationwide controversy over its decision about a monument
to the Ten Commandments in Alabama.
This Article highlights some of the key legal principles the court
follows in ruling on First Amendment cases. The Article shows how the
court, applying the same legal theories, reaches different results based
on the facts of the case. This organization enhances the reader's
understanding of these complex legal problems. This Article also
considers in depth the issue of standing because the Eleventh Circuit
stated this term that standing is "[plerhaps the most fundamental
doctrine that has emerged from the case-or-controversy requirement."1
II.

FIRST AMENDMENT

A.

Standing
In Focus on the Family v. PinellasSuncoast TransitAuthority,2 Focus
on the Family ("Focus"), an evangelical organization, sued Pinellas
Suncoast Transit Authority ("PSTA") seeking injunctive relief. Focus
contended that PSTA violated its First Amendment rights by prohibiting
it from advertising its conference on homosexuality, called "Love Won

*

United States District Court Judge for the Middle District of Georgia. University of

Georgia (A.B., 1971; J.D., 1974; M.A., 1978).
1. Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 943 (11th Cir. 2003).
2. 344 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
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Out," on county bus stop shelters. A PSTA representative first agreed
to let Focus advertise on the shelters and signed a contract, which
prompted Focus to send artwork to the printer. When PSTA realized
that the word "homosexuality" would appear in the advertisements,
PSTA rejected them based on a provision in the contract that allowed it
to control the content of the advertisements. Focus contended that this
amounted to viewpoint-based restriction on its speech. 3
The district court granted summary judgment to PSTA based in part
on the position that Focus could not satisfy standing requirements for
constitutional action because it could neither show actual nor future
harm; therefore, Focus failed to prove injury in fact and causation.4
The court of appeals reversed and concluded that Focus had standing.5
Focus suffered an injury for standing purposes because PSTA had
stopped Focus from advertising after it had spent time, energy, and
money on the project, and the conference was probably less well attended
because of the lack of advertising. 6 These facts satisfied the requirement for an injury-in-fact or "an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is .. .concrete and particularized,"7 as required under the first
prong of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.'
With respect to the second prong of the Lujan test-the requirement
for proof of a causal connection 9 -the court explained that proximate
cause does not apply to the doctrine of standing.1 ° Instead, the court
said that "even harms that flow indirectly from the action in question
can be said to be 'fairly traceable' to that action for standing purposes." 1 Because Focus could show PSTA's direct involvement in rejecting
the advertising campaign, it satisfied the causation prong. 2 The court
of appeals cited the United States Supreme Court to expand on this
point:
The essence of the standing question, in its constitutional dimension,
is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy' (as) to warrant his invocation of federalcourt jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf." The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by

3. Id. at 1268-71.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1271.
at 1268.
at 1273.
at 1272-73 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

8. 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
9. Id.
10.
11.
12.

Pinellas, 344 F.3d at 1273.
Id.
Id.
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the challenged action of the defendant. The injury may be indirect, but
the complaint must indicate that the13 injury is indeed fairly traceable
to the defendant's acts or omissions.
. re orVl s.uwed Lia a PSIA employee had told a F'ocus representative that PSTA rejected the advertisements because it did not like the
word "homosexuality."14 The record also showed that PSTA rejected
them because of their "political controversialism, offensiveness and their
potential to subject a discernible social group to ridicule [which were
expressly designated in the agreement as unacceptable]." 5 Based on
this evidence, the court found not only sufficient evidence of causation
but also held that enjoining PSTA from enforcing the agreement could
redress the wrong.1 6 Likewise, on the third element of the standing
issue-redressibility-the court followed the causation analysis and said
that if the agreement caused Focus to suffer injury, enjoining the
enforcement of the agreement could redress the injury also." Thus,
Focus satisfied the redressibility requirement for standing."s
The court further held that the district court erred in its denial of
standing based on Focus's failure to show the need for prospective
injunctive or declarative relief.'9 To have standing to obtain forwardlooking relief, a plaintiff must show that he will suffer more illegal
conduct in the future. 20 A "merely conjectural or hypothetical ...
threat of future injury" is not enough. 1 However, the court explained
that "[s]tanding does not have to be maintained throughout all stages of
litigation. Instead, it is to be determined as of the time the complaint
is filed."22 Focus could show the need for declaratory relief because it
alleged that it intended to have another conference in the future and
would once again seek to advertise the conference.23 Because Focus
could show injury-in-fact, causation and redressibility, and the need for

13.
260-61
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
2001)).
22.
23.

Id. (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
(1977) (emphasis in original)).
Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1274-75.
Id. at 1275 (quoting Wooden v. Bd. of Regents, 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir.
Id. (quoting NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 1275-76.
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prospective relief, the court reversed the district court and held that
Focus was entitled to be heard on its First Amendment claims.24
In two other cases, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs had no
standing to challenge the actions of the government on First Amendment
grounds.2 5 In Women's Emergency Network v. Bush,2' a nonprofit
organization and several individuals challenged Florida's authorization
of license plates stating "Choose Life" and the use of state funds
generated from the sale of the license plates to help adoption agencies.
A Florida statute authorized specialty license plates and the use of the
money collected from the purchase of the tags for specific purposes.2 7
Plaintiffs claimed that (1) the statute violated their freedom of speech
by not offering a similar forum for pro-choice car owners, (2) it discriminated based on the viewpoint of the recipients of the money, and (3) it
created an excessive entanglement of religion by delegating an important
governmental function to religious organizations. 8
In holding that the plaintiffs had no standing, the court first noted
that state taxpayers ordinarily lack sufficient interest to challenge laws
of general applicability because "their injury is not significantly different
from that suffered by taxpayers in general."29 However, a relaxed
standard applies in Establishment Clause violations alleged by
taxpayers.31 Under this relaxed standard, the taxpayer must demonstrate "a logical link between his taxpayer status and the challenged
legislative enactment, and a nexus between his taxpayer status and the
precise nature of the alleged constitutional infringement." 31 Under the
taxpayer standing analysis, plaintiff Becker showed that he resided in
Palm Beach County, he paid taxes in the county, and the county
expended municipal funds in negotiating a contract with the religious
organization Catholic Charities. However, he could not show any injury
because the mere negotiation of a contract with a religious organization
does not create an Establishment Clause issue.12 Because the government had never entered into a contract with Catholic Charities, there
was no contract to consider, and the court of appeals could not say that

24.
25.
Pryor,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1276.
Women's Emergency Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937, 950 (11th Cir. 2003); Doe v.
344 F.3d 1282, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2003).
323 F.3d 937 (2003).
FLA. STAT. § 320.08058(30) (2002).
323 F.3d at 941-42.
Id. at 943.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 943-45.
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the government's actions were unconstitutional. 33 Thus, plaintiff's
injuries were speculative and failed to satisfy Lujan's injury-in-fact
requirement.3 4 Moreover, under theories of individual standing and
organization-Lal -taniniLg, becuse plaintiffs had iiever aLLempued Lo
present their pro-choice view on license plates under the same Florida
statute, they could not show that the state had denied them the right to
express their viewpoint. 35 The court stated that "[tihe First Amendment protects the right to speak; it does not give [aippellants the right
to stop others with opposing viewpoints from speaking. "36
In Doe v. Pryor,3 7 concerning gay rights, plaintiffs sued the Attorney
General of Alabama as chief law enforcer of the state and claimed that
an Alabama statute that criminalized deviant sexual intercourse violated
their First Amendment rights.3 " The court of appeals ruled the
plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the law because they failed to
show they suffered any injuries fairly traceable to the action of the
defendant. 39
To show that a criminal statute may chill expression protected by the
First Amendment, a plaintiff must show "'that either (1) [they were]
threatened with prosecution; (2) prosecution is likely; or (3) there is a
credible threat of prosecution.' 4 ° In Pryor plaintiffs could not show
that they had been threatened with prosecution or that there was any
credible threat of prosecution.41 Indeed, the Attorney General had
expressly conceded in a supplemental brief that the Supreme Court's
ruling in Lawrence v. Texas 42 made the Alabama statute on private,
consensual oral and anal sex unconstitutional.4 3
B.

Religious Symbols
Chief Justice Roy S. Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court placed a
two-and-one-half ton monument of the Ten Commandments in the
rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building under cover of darkness

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 945.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 945-46.
Id. at 947.
344 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1287-88.

40. Id. at 1287 (quoting Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001)).
41. Id.
42. 539 U.S. 558.
43.

Pryor,344 F.3d at 1287.
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and without consulting his colleagues. In taking this action, he fulfilled
a campaign promise to restore the moral foundation of law."'
Three attorneys in Alabama, who regularly entered the judicial
building while practicing law, sued Moore, asserting that his actions
violated the Establishment Clause and sought declaratory relief to force
Moore to remove the monument. The plaintiffs contended that the
monument offended them and made them feel like outsiders because
they did not share Justice Moore's religious beliefs. Two of the plaintiffs
went to the judicial building less frequently because of the monument.
One plaintiff avoided the building by buying law books rather than doing
legal research in the building's law library and by hiring a runner to
deliver documents to court offices in the building.45
After a seven-day bench trial, district court Judge Myron Thompson
entered judgment for plaintiffs and ordered Moore to remove the
monument. Thompson reasoned that Moore's actions violated the
Establishment Clause because he had a nonsecular purpose for
displaying the monument and the monument's primary effect advanced
religion. Judge Thompson found that Moore erected the monument not
simply to honor the Ten Commandments, but also to honor the JudeoChristian God.46
The court of appeals began its review by noting that when a plaintiff
brings a challenge under the Establishment Clause, the court must
consider the challenge on a case-by-case basis by analyzing specific facts
With this in mind, the court
rather than by using bright-line rules.
carefully analyzed the record and dealt with two major legal issues:
whether plaintiffs had standing to sue, and whether placing the
monument in the Alabama State Judicial Building violated the
Establishment Clause.48
On the first issue the court began by stating the elements necessary
for standing:
[T]o satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article III, which
is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing, a plaintiff
must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered "injury in
fact," that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of the defen-

44. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2003).
45. Id. at 1288.
46. Id. See Judge Thompson's excellent and thorough opinion in Glassroth v. Moore,
229 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
47. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1288.
48. Id. at 1291-92.
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dant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable
decision.49
Plaintiffs have standing if the law or practice about which they
complain directly affects them, such as forcing them to "'assume special
burdens' to avoid 'unwelcome religious exercises. ' "' ° On this issue the
court held that two of the three plaintiffs had standing because they had
altered their behavior to avoid the monument, and they would continue
to suffer from the monument's presence in the rotunda because they
could not completely avoid it in their law practice.5 1 The court further
held that by requiring Chief Justice Moore to remove the monument, the
court could redress plaintiffs' injuries.
The court then turned to the more complex issue of the alleged
Establishment Clause violation.5 3 The Establishment Clause prohibits
any law with respect to an establishment of religion.54 According to the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court has come to an understanding of
the general meaning of this clause in this way:
[the] government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious
doctrine or organization, may not discriminate among persons on the
basis of their religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate a
governmental power to a religious institution, and may not involve
itself too deeply in such an institution's affairs. 5
The First Amendment protects not only adherents to various branches
of Christianity but also the infidel and the atheist as well.56
The court then noted that the Ten Commandments have an inherently
religious nature, and a government's use of them must satisfy the threestep analysis of Lemon v. Kurtzman.57 The court explained that "[t]he
Lemon test requires that the challenged practice have a valid secular
purpose, not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion."" The court
held that Moore's own statements about the monument demonstrated

49. Id. at 1292 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)).
50. Id. (quoting ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. 698 F.2d 1098,
1107 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1292-93.
53. Id. at 1293.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989)).
56. Id. at 1294-95.
57. Id. at 1295; see Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
58. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1295.
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that he did not have a secular purpose for placing the monument in the
Alabama Judicial Building.5 9
The court further noted that the monument had the primary effect of
advancing religion." ° The effect prong of the Lemon test "asks whether
... the practice under review in fact would convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval to an informed, reasonable observer." 1
Once again, Moore's own statements about the monument supported this
conclusion. 2 He said that the monument "reflects the sovereignty of
God over men."63 As a consequence, the court held that Moore's actions
failed the first two prongs of the Lemon test and violated the First
Amendment.64
The court then distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Marsh
65
v. Chambers
because Moore argued that Marsh authorized him to
place the monument in the building.66 In Marsh the Supreme Court
denied a challenge under the Lemon test to the Nebraska legislature's
practice of having prayer to open legislative sessions.67 Because of the
long heritage of such practices in our republic, including opening prayers
in the United States Congress, Nebraska's legislature did not violate the
Constitution by having an opening prayer.6 8 Unlike Marsh, Moore
could not prove "an 'unambiguous and unbroken history' of displaying
religious symbols in judicial buildings." 9 The court would not approve
a broad reading of Marsh to support Moore's actions.7 °
In King v. Richmond County,71 a Ten Commandments case at the
other end of the spectrum of public controversy, the court applied the
Lemon test to the seal of the clerk of superior court for Richmond
County, Georgia, and held that it did not violate the Establishment
Clause.7 2 The seal outlines the Ten Commandments and includes a
sword and the name of the court. The clerk only uses it to authenticate
documents such as real estate records, witness subpoenas, and attorney

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297.
Id. (quoting King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1297-98.
463 U.S. at 786, 795.
Id.
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1298.
Id.
331 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1275-78.
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licenses. The seal does not appear on the clerk's letterhead or website
and is not displayed anywhere in the courthouse. Clerks have used the
seal for 130 years.73
in applying the Lemon test, the court explained that the first element
of the test-the purpose prong-requires the court to ascertain the
purpose of the government practice at issue."4 Richmond County could
not offer any evidence of what the government intended 130 years
earlier about the purpose of the design of the seal.75 The court did not
find this fatal to the county's defense because the county offered a
plausible secular purpose for the seal's design.7 6 It argued that the Ten
Commandments on the shield "enabled illiterate citizens to recognize the
legal validity of documents displaying the Seal."77 This argument
satisfied the government's initial burden under the purpose prong.78
The court explained that under the effect prong, the second element
of the Lemon test, "even when evidence of religious purpose is lacking,
the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from 'appearing to
take a position on questions of religious belief relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community."'79 The context of the
government's use of the alleged religious symbol is the touchstone of the
effect prong.8" In this case, because of the small size and limited use
of the seal and because the outline of the Ten Commandments was not
the only symbol on the seal, the seal did not fail the effect prong."1
Such contextual factors "make it less likely that a reasonable observer
would believe that the government intended to send a message of
religious endorsement."82 Thus, because the seal did not have the
purpose or primary effect of endorsing religion, it did not violate the
Establishment Clause.83
C.

Adult Entertainment

In Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v.Manatee County, Florida, 4 the court reviewed a zoning ordinance and a public nudity

73.

Id. at 1273-74.

74. Id. at 1276.
75.
76.

Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1276-78.

77.

Id. at 1278.

78.

Id.

79. Id. (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 1284-85.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
337 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2003).
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ordinance, both of which plaintiff alleged violated its First Amendment
rights.8 5 In analyzing these ordinances, the court undertook a comprehensive summary of Supreme Court cases on First Amendment rights to
freedom of expression. 6 This opinion merits careful reading for anyone
interested in this area of the law.
The court first noted that although the Supreme Court had used
closely related and sometimes overlapping analyses for zoning ordinances and public nudity ordinances, these two types of regulatory actions
required separate evaluations.87 For a zoning ordinance that regulates
operating conditions, the court should consider the standards for time,
place, and manner regulations set forth in Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.88 and in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.89 For a
Renton analysis, the court must first
determine whether the ordinance constitutes an invalid total ban or
merely a time, place, and manner regulation; second, if the ordinance
is determined to be a time, place, and manner regulation, the court
must decide whether the ordinance should be subject to strict or
intermediate scrutiny; and third, if the ordinance is held to be subject
to intermediate scrutiny, the court must determine whether it is
designed to serve a substantial government interest and allows for
reasonable alternative channels of communication. 90
For content-neutral public nudity ordinances, the court should
consider the four-part test described in United States v. O'Brien.91
Under O'Brien public nudity bans are constitutional "if they (1) are
within the constitutional power of the government to enact; (2) further
a substantial government interest; (3) are unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and (4) restrict First Amendment freedoms
no greater
92
than necessary to further the government's interest."
In Peek-A-Boo Lounge the court first considered the zoning ordinance
that imposed building requirements only on adult dancing establish93
ments and authorized searches of these businesses without a warrant.

85. Id. at 1252-53.
86.

Id. at 1255-64.

87. Id. at 1264.
88. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
89. 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (clarifying how to interpret step three under Renton and prong
two under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 397 (1968)); Peek-A-Boo Lounge, 337 F.3d at
1264.
90. Peek-A-Boo Lounge, 337 F.3d at 1264 (citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-50).
91. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Erie
v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
92. Peek-A-Boo Lounge, 337 F.3d at 1264 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367-77).
93. Id. at 1265.
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It applied the third step under Renton and asked if the ordinance was
narrowly tailored to the government's interest. 94 In considering this
issue, the court looked to the evidence that the county used to justify the
o
1
.
I
...
J
__
2_
-95
rrL_.
.
..
UII....,.,.
.LIC 4,..iL0Y iiau U ev Uc.A Ut le becuuary
.
l'ecuLs of
nude dancing on the community that it might have reasonably believed
to be relevant and which would rationally support the ordinance at the
Although Renton does not require much
time it was enacted.96
evidence and does not require a municipality to have new studies or
studies directed to the locale in question, it does require the municipality
to show some link between the ordinance and the design of the
ordinance to combat undesirable secondary effects in the community at
the time of enactment.9 7 Because of this failure, the court held the
ordinance unconstitutional. 9
The court then considered the second ordinance that regulated public
nudity directly and nude dancing only incidentally.99 Because this type
of ordinance prohibits all public nudity without reference to nude
dancing, its impact on expression is only incidental; therefore, the
ordinance is content-neutral, and the O'Brien test applies.' 00 Like the
third part of the Renton analysis, the second prong of O'Brien examines
the government's substantial interest in preventing deleterious
secondary effects of adult entertainment on the community and the
evidence used by the government to tailor the ordinance to combat those
effects.'
Because the county enacted the public nudity ordinance
after it had enacted the zoning ordinance and found some evidence of
secondary effects to support it, this ordinance did not fail for lack of
supporting evidence at the time of enactment. 10 2 However, under
Alameda Books, not only must the government have supporting evidence,
but it must also afford a plaintiff the opportunity to dispute the
government's rationale with plaintiff's own evidence. 10 3 If a plaintiff
succeeds in casting doubt on the government's evidence, then the burden
shifts back to the government to supplement the record with more

94. Id. at 1266.
95.

Id.

96. Id.
97.
98.

Id. at 1268-71.
Id. at 1269.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
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evidence04 on its theory of secondary effects that support the ordinance. 1
In this case, the plaintiffs, two adult lounges, challenged the sufficiency of the county's evidence by presenting evidence that disputed any
secondary effects around the adult lounges in Manatee County.105 The
adult lounges showed that crime rates were lower near their businesses
than in other areas and that property values had actually gone up
rather than down." 6 The adult lounges also submitted three expert
studies of Manatee County that showed there was no evidence connecting the businesses with negative secondary effects. 107 Based on the
evidence, the court held that the adult lounges carried their burden of
challenging the county's evidence, thus shifting the burden back to the
county to offer new evidence. 0 8 Because the county failed to offer new
evidence in the district court and because substantial questions of fact
existed, the court held that summary judgment for the county was
improper and reversed the district court.'0 9
The court of appeals also directed the district court to consider the
issue of the scope of the public nudity ordinance on remand."' The
ordinance not only prohibited public nudity, but it also banned the use
of G-strings, pasties, and thongs."' It defined nudity as "the wearing
of any clothing covering less than one-third of the buttocks or one-fourth
of the female breast."" 2 With respect to this issue, the court noted
that the fourth prong of O'Brien requires "that any incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms be no greater than is essential to
further the government's interest.""3 In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 4
the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that required nude dancers to
wear pasties and G-strings, noting that these limited dress requirements
5
left ample opportunity for dancers to convey an erotic message."
However, the more stringent requirements of the Manatee County
ordinance "could significantly impact that message."1 ' Thus, the court

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
529 U.S. 277 (2000).
Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1274.
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of appeals directed the district court to consider whether the ordinance
would fail under the intermediate scrutiny analysis because it put too
many restrictions on a dancer's right to expression." '
In Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach,"' a dance club challenged
an adult entertainment ordinance on several grounds, alleging that (1)
the ordinance authorized only three sites in the community for adult
entertainment, (2) the ordinance gave unbridled discretion to city
officials to grant a license, and (3) the licensing fee was unconstitutional. 119
The court of appeals examined the restricted number of sites available
under the zoning regulation following the requirements of Renton.'20
It noted that "under Renton, a zoning ordinance that restricts the
location of adult entertainment establishments must serve a substantial
government interest and 'leave open ample alternative avenues of
communication. ' 12' In this case, the city made three sites available
for four adult entertainment businesses. 22 In other words, plaintiff
dance club had nowhere within the city limits to operate its business. 2' Although the court did not adopt a bright-line rule, it did hold
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because the city did not provide
sufficient sites for all124the adult entertainment businesses operating
within the city limits.
The court of appeals also held that the time allowed under the
ordinance for granting a license was unconstitutional because it was a
prior restraint on protected expression. 21 It stated that "'[a] law
subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior
restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards
to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.'' 126 The ordinance
was unconstitutional because it gave city officials an indefinite time to
grant the license, which meant that the city could deny a license by
taking no action.'27 The ordinance stated that if the city did not act
on the application within thirty days a license would be issued pending

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
(1969)).
127.

Id.
337 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1309.
Id. (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 50).
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1312-13.
Id. at 1313 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
Id.
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the city's approval; however, this type of conditional licensing is
unconstitutional.12

As to the licensing fee, the court noted that "when core First Amendment freedoms are made subject to a licensing scheme, only revenueneutral fees may be imposed so that [the] government is not charging for
the privilege of exercising a constitutional right. " 129 The government
may not profit from taxing protected rights."0 The government has
the burden of showing the fee is "reasonably related to recoupment of
the costs of administering the licensing program.""' Because the city
failed to make an adequate record on its costs for administering
the
2
licensing program, the court held the fee unconstitutional.1
In Artistic Entertainment,Inc. v. City of Warner Robins,'3 the court
of appeals held two ordinances designed to prohibit the consumption of
alcohol on the premises of a nude dance club constitutional.'
In the
previous appeal, the court held that one of the city's licensing ordinances
acted as an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression because it did
not provide a reasonable time limit on the business's right to begin
operating if the city failed to act on the application.135 The city
amended the ordinance after the remand, and the amendment gave the
city council forty-five days to approve the license. If the city council did
not act within that time, then the license would be approved and issued
without further action. 13 6 This amendment cured the problem of the
unconstitutional prior restraint of an indefinite time within which the
city had to act on the license." 7
D. Commerce and the FirstAmendment
In Uptown Pawn & Jewelry, Inc. v. City of Hollywood,"' the court
considered the city's policy of refusing to let pawn shops advertise on bus
benches on the city's rights-of-way."19 The first step of the court's

128.
129.
130.
1991)).
131.
132.
133.
1199.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1313-14.
Id. at 1314.
Id. (citing Sentinel Communications v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1205 (11th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1315.
331 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2003). This was the third appeal of this case. Id. at
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1203.

Id.
337 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1276.
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analysis involved determining whether the bus benches created a public
forum or a nonpublic forum.14 ° Restrictions on speech in a public
forum require strict scrutiny, but restrictions on nonpublic forums pass
constitutional muster if they are reasonable and are not viewpoint
discriminatory.'
Public forums commonly include streets and parks
42
or areas expressly dedicated to speech activity by the government.
Because the city had not dedicated the bus benches to First Amendment
activity and because the city as a proprietor used the bus benches to
generate revenue, the reasonableness standard of a nonpublic forum
43
applied.
The court then considered the reasonableness of the city's policy and
held it constitutional. 44 The reasonableness standard does not require
45
the most reasonable limitation or the only reasonable limitation.
Moreover, the city did not have to show evidence of the reasonableness
of the limitation in the record. 41 Common sense is enough under a
reasonableness review, and the court held that common sense supported
the city's desire to have only more desirable advertisers using the
benches. 47 Also, the numerous alternative means available to the
pawn shop to advertise supported the reasonableness of the city's
limitation on what types of businesses could advertise on bus bench-

es. 148

In Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Atlanta Department of
Aviation, 49 the court of appeals rendered an en banc opinion on the
city of Atlanta's control over the sale of newspapers in newspaper racks
at Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport. 50
The city charged a
profit-conscious fee of $20 per month for the use of each newsstand on
airport property and restricted the number of newspaper publishers that
could use the newsstands. The district court enjoined this scheme,
finding that the fees were impermissible because the city charged more
than its administrative costs for the use of the newsstand and because
the plan gave unrestrained discretion in deciding which newspapers

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
movies,
149.
150.

Id. at 1277.
Id.
Id. at 1278.
Id. The plaintiff did not raise issues about viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1280-81.
Id. at 1281. The policy also prohibited advertisements for liquor, tobacco, x-rated
adult bookstores, and massage parlors. Id. at 1279.
322 F.3d 1298 (lth Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1301.
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could have permits. The plan prohibited individualized news racks, and
only the Atlanta Journal & Constitution, USA Today, and The New York
Times could lease the racks. 5 '
The court of appeals, en banc, agreed that the plan gave too much
discretion to the city, even in this nonpublic forum context. 15 2 The
First Amendment protects the distribution of newspapers as well as the
publication of newspapers.' 5' As the court explained, "A grant of
unrestrained discretion to an official responsible for monitoring and
regulating First Amendment activities is facially unconstitutional."' 54
Such power must be controlled by structural and procedural safeguards
that protect against abuse of First Amendment rights.'55 The discretion must be reasonable and not simply controlled by the marketplace. 5"' 6 Because the plan lacked these safeguards
and gave too much
157
power to the city, it was unconstitutional.
The court, however, reversed the district court and the panel on the
profit-conscious fee issue-the main issue in the case."'8 The court
explained that both federal and state regulations require the Atlanta
Department of Aviation to operate the airport in a self-sufficient manner
and that Congress has authorized airport authorities to charge
reasonable fees.' 59 The court further noted that one-half of all airport
revenue comes from concessions and parking. 6 ' In light of the need
to generate revenue through concessions to support the airport, the court
would not restrict the city to its administrative costs for leasing the
newsstands.' 6 ' Moreover, the court held that the city, acting as a
proprietor, charged a reasonable fee to lease the newsstands and that
the newspaper publishers had alternate distribution channels in the
airport through newsstands to sell their papers. 162 It explained that
"'[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal
operations, rather than acting as a lawmaker with the power to regulate
or license, its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to

151. Id. at 1304-05.
152. Id. at 1311.
153. Id. at 1305.
154. Id. at 1310.
155. Id. at 1311.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1312.
159. Id. at 1302.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1312.
162. Id. at 1309.
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which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.'"'"
If the government acts reasonably as a proprietor, then its actions will not offend the
First Amendment.'"
E.

Symbolic Speech

The Confederate battle flag once again became an issue in Scott v.
6 5
School Board of Alachua County."
A school principal suspended
several students for displaying the Confederate flag at school after being
told not to do so, and the students claimed that this action violated their
rights to symbolic speech."' The court held that the school principal's
unwritten ban of the flag at school did not violate the students'
constitutional rights." 7
The First Amendment has unique application in the context of a
school." . The court explained that "[a]lthough public school students'
First Amendment rights are not forfeited at the school door, those rights
should not interfere with a school administrator's professional observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore could lead to, an
unhealthy and potentially unsafe learning environment for the children
they serve."6 9 A principal can censure a student's speech under two
theories. 70 First, if principals reasonably fear that certain speech is
likely to disrupt school discipline, then they are authorized to prohibit
the speech. 7 ' Second, school administrators can restrict speech, even
if disruption is unlikely, because they have the duty to train their
students about the requirements of civility.'72 This need for civility as
a public virtue in a democracy authorizes school administrators to
prohibit the use of offensive or threatening modes of speech.'7 3
Furthermore, schools should teach students of all races how to live and
work together and to avoid the use of symbols that evoke racial prejudice
or feelings of hatred or resentment.'

163. Id. at 1308 (quoting Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992)).
164. Id.
165. 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003).
166. Id. at 1247.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1248.
171. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
172. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
173. Id. (citing Fraser,478 U.S. at 683).
174. Id. at 1249.
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In this case school officials presented evidence of racial tension in the
school and racially motivated fights between students shortly before the
time the principal banned the flag from the school grounds.175 As a
consequence, the principal's actions in suspending the students who
persisted in displaying the Confederate flag did not violate the First
17
Amendment."
III. CONCLUSION
These cases on the First Amendment teach us something about our
society and something about our legal system that is not necessarily
apparent to the practitioner trying to decide how to plead a case, or to
a federal judge trying to rule on a motion for summary judgment. About
society, we see the ever increasing polarization over social issues that
divide our country and that galvanize people and organizations into
action. About our legal system, we see that the courts are the new
battlefields for the action of these polarized groups. Whether it is a
conservative, evangelical organization like Focus on the Family suing a
county authority or a pro-abortion group suing the state over pro-life car
tags, both "sides" look to the courts, especially the federal courts, to
protect their rights. This reality imposes on the courts an obligation of
special vigilance to protect the rights of all members of our free society,
and it also shows the fundamental importance of the First Amendment
to our freedom.
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